t the March 1999 Preparatory Committee Meeting for the United Nations General Assembly Special Session's five-year review of the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD+5), the "pro-family" newspaper Vivant! published a feature artiele, replete with statistical data and graphics, condemning the "flawed human rights-based approach to health."' Central to the article's attack was an argument embracing the discourse of "basic needs" as a framework ethically and socially superior to that of human rights. Associating such infrastructural conditions as safe water and nutrition with the "needs" approach and reproductive and sexual health with the "rights" approach, it alleged that "indiscriminate funding for the ICPD's idealistically high standards of reproductive and sexual health rights" had caused "underfunding and deterioration of more basic, practicable and affordable health needs" (emphasis added). The article further insinuated that such "flawed" priorities reflect a Western agenda (read, of Western feminists) with a blatant disregard for the genuine needs and priorities of women in the South.2 One does not have to defend the deplorable record of the U.S. government and U.S.-based corporations with regard to Southern women's health needs to see that this rhetoric has a primary strategic aim: to demonstrate the
approach" as distinct from a "rights-based" one, invoked here by a Catholic NGO allied with the Vatican, actually derives from classical Marxism. Specifically, it harks back to the distinction Marx and Engels made between "the satisfaction of human needs" and "bourgeois rights." According to the orthodox interpretation of Marx's division of social relations into a material "base" and an ideological "superstructure," the former not only determines the latter but is the repository of the most basic necessities for the production of human life (i.e., material "needs"). "Rights," on the other hand, refer to the catalogue of civil and political freedoms that groups demand from those in power to assert their equal claims to citizenship. They are the means toward emancipation but not the ends, the conditions of "mental life" and "idealism" (note the Vivant! article's description of reproductive and sexual rights as "idealistically high standards") but not of real social and material life. In other words, there is a difference between voting or speaking freely about abortion ("rights") and eating l "needs") .5
Of course there is a certain kernel of truth here, which is what makes both the Marxist and the Vatican positions seem compelling at first. Northern and industrialized countries, particularly the U.S., surely do champion certain reproductive and sexual health rights to the virtual exclusion of health infrastructure needs such as safe water and sanitation. Consider the statement by a U.S. delegate participating in the Third Preparatory Committee Meeting (Prep Com) for Beijing in March 1995. She stated that the U.S. delegation must oppose a provision of the draft Platform's chapter on health urging governments to "ensure access to safe drinking water and sanitation and put in place effective public distribution systems by the year 2000." This, she argued, was an "infrastructural problem" and such time-based targets were "unrealistic."6 On the other hand, as Mukhopadhyay and Sivaramayya have noted, Southern governments* and local officials tend to associate "development" with large, publicly "visible" and structural projects, "such as building roads or digging wells," to the detriment of the less visible, less "material" HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS health needs of women and children.7
But the subordination by Northern countries of development to primarily political and civil rights, and the subordination by some Southern governments and the Vatican and its allies of human rights to economic development and poverty alleviation (associated with "basic human needs"), are really two sides of the same coin. Both imply that individual needs and social needs, or needs and rights, somehow belong to different realms. This dichotomization, as many critics have noted, was a major outgrowth of the Cold War political environment and has had a direct counterpart in debates over human rights themselves. ences.10 On the other hand, the main international bodies responsible for health and development, the World Bank and WHO, rarely if ever east their policies in human rights terms as opposed to economistic "cost-benefit" terms. "Rights" and "needs" remain split even within the UN's institutional machinery.
Underlying the "rights"/"needs" dichotomy is a basic fallacy. What this dichotomy ignores is that rights are merely the codification of needs, reformulated as ethical and legal norms and thus implying a duty on the part of those in power to provide all the means necessary to make sure those needs are met. This duty is affirmative as well as negative; that is, "states have an obligation not only to respect (to not do harm) but also to take positive measures to ensure [the enjoyment of rights]."11 The terminology of "human" and "universal" simply says that there should be no distinctions of class, gender, race, ethnicity, age, region, and so on; the rights belong to all persons and the duties to fulfill them to all authorities. Rights are meaningless, in other words, without needs. But needs cannot stand on their own as ethical principles, because they lack any intrinsic methods for (a) determining whose and which needs should take precedence, (b) assigning obligations to specific parties for fulfilling those needs, and (c) empowering those whose needs are at stake to speak for themselves. Without some principle of "personhood" or moral agency-available only through a human rights framework-there is nothing to prevent the state, medical experts, or religious authorities from deciding what is good for women or young people on the basis of political expediency, aggregate data, or fundamentalist interpretations of scripture.12 Rights-bearers, on the other hand-who may be groups as well as individuals-are by definition those who are authorized to make official claims before established adjudicating bodies in defense of their own needs, now codified and formalized as rights. As a recent World Bank publication puts it, "[public] institutions matter. "113 This may seem to beg the question of whether some needs, and their corresponding rights, are more "basic" or "fundamental" than others. But my whole point is that there is a logical interconnection between rights and needs and the indivisibility of different forms of rights, so that prioritizing makes no sense. This is especially apparent when we look concretely at specific reproductive and sexual rights and the ways in which they cluster together with other rights in women's everyday lives. Even deciding whether to classify such rights as "social," "economic," "cultural," or also "civil and political" is very 24 Contrast these realities with the statement of the U.S. delegate in the Beijing Prep Com I quoted earlier. Belying the "pragmatic" tone of the U.S. position and underlying the public health context in which the Women's Health Project frames its South Africa report is a profoundly ethical truth: if certain "infrastructural" conditions and macroeconomic policies are indispensable for creating the enabling environment for reproductive and sexual rights to become practical realities, then those conditions and policies must be incorporated into our ethical framework and understood not only as "basic needs" but as fundamental human rights. Thus "social and economic" rights are no more or less important than those more obviously related to reproduction, sexuality, and health; rather, together they form a single fabric of rights that are interdependent and indivisible, all of them grounded in basic human needs.
